Neutrality requirements arising from funding conditions and grant award notices

Youth organisations and associations, like other independent providers of youth welfare services, are generally dependent on public funding. The corresponding obligation to provide funding is set out in Section 11 and, in particular, Section 12 of SGB VIII (the Child and Youth Welfare Act). The Conference of the Ministers for Youth and Family Affairs of the Länder (JFMK) reaffirms: “Public institutions must respect the independent operation of these organisations and their autonomy in accordance with their statutes, even when funding their work […]” (14) and “it is also the responsibility of public bodies to support independent organisations and to provide them with the confidence to act. Independent youth work organisations are ‘holders of fundamental rights’ (including freedom of expression, religion and the arts) and do not lose this status even when they receive public funding.” (15). Far-right extremists often falsely claim that public funding transfers the state’s requirement of neutrality to independent organisations such as youth associations and federations. This is a claim that finds favour with some state actors (see Deyda 2023). This false claim is a strategy designed to intimidate civil society. The view that, through its funding, the state endorses the activities of an independent organisation and thereby becomes responsible for them is a “statist misconception” (Deyda 2024). The blanket extension of the state’s duty of neutrality is unacceptable due to the constitutional protection of freedom of expression (see Hufen 2018: 216–221).

However, obligations regarding political neutrality may be imposed as conditions for funding (e.g.ancillary provisions in a funding decision; see BJR 2019: 11) or within the framework of a mutual agreement (e.g. a funding contract). This applies, however, only to the extent that the association’s autonomy and the organisation’s independent existence in accordance with its articles of association are not unduly impaired. The extent to which this is the case must be assessed on a case-by-case basis (see Weitzmann 2021: 11–15). A restriction limited to a specific subject area may be lawful if it does not concern funding under Section 12 of Book VIII of the Social Code (SGB VIII), but rather project funding for a specific, definable activity.

If an independent organisation is obliged, via a supplementary provision, to observe ‘political neutrality’ or to ensure ‘equal opportunities for political parties’, this contradicts the guiding principle set out above. The inclusion of such wording in a grant award notice in the context of funding under Section 11 or even Section 12 of SGB VIII for youth organisations would constitute a blanket application of the state’s requirement for neutrality and would have little to do with what can be inferred from the JFMK resolution (see JFMK 2025: 15). It is generally advisable not to accept these or similar ancillary provisions, either politically or legally. Provided that suitable channels of communication with the administration exist, it is recommended to work towards, for example by using the arguments set out here, mitigating these ancillary provisions or, in the best-case scenario, having them removed entirely. If, despite the statutory obligation for the public youth welfare authority to cooperate on a partnership basis (Section 4 of Book VIII of the Social Code), such cooperation is no longer possible, a written objection to the decision should be lodged. This is often required within a period of one month (Section 70(1) of the Administrative Court Rules (VwGO)) to prevent the decision from becoming final. Where required by law, in some cases legal proceedings must be brought directly before the competent administrative court within the time limit, without first going through an appeal procedure, to prevent the decision, including the ancillary provision, from becoming final. It is therefore strongly recommended that the waiver of legal assistance, which is often enclosed with a funding decision, be signed explicitly only in respect of the ancillary provision that is not being contested. Should the administration continue to insist on the chosen ancillary provision and show itself willing to specify this in more detail, for example by letter or email, so that it becomes acceptable to the youth welfare agency in the specific individual case, this may constitute a solution that defuses the conflict. Provided that this correspondence clearly refers to the specific ancillary provision in the specific grant decision, this amends the previous decision in accordance with Section 37(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act (VwVfG), meaning that such an email is also legally binding.

The specific political and legal arguments against such an ancillary provision depend on the exact wording in the decision and the nature of the agency. A common problem with the wording of ancillary provisions is that they are very general and vague. In youth work practice, it often remains entirely unclear exactly which types of measures are still permitted and which are not. It is therefore questionable whether such broad wording in ancillary provisions is compatible with Section 37(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (VwVfG), which stipulates that an administrative act must be sufficiently specific in its content. Furthermore, in many contexts, it is legally questionable whether such an ancillary provision is permissible at all, particularly in the context of funding for youth organisations under Section 12(1) of Book VIII of the Social Code (SGB VIII), as Section 36(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (VwVfG) requires a corresponding legal basis. With regard to youth work, and in particular the work of youth organisations, it could further be argued that a strictly worded ancillary provision which would, in effect, prohibit any political engagement with a party’s positions on youth policy would run counter to the purpose of the funding. However, this is not permissible under Section 36(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act (VwVfG). As the representation of political interests is a legally recognised task of youth organisations under Section 12(2) of Book VIII of the Social Code (SGB VIII), this cannot in turn be prohibited by a supplementary provision.

A key challenge is that there is a lack of specific case law regarding this type of ancillary provision in the context of youth welfare, and the wording varies from case to case; consequently, it must be assessed individually on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specific context. Should the decision not be amended, it is advisable to seek legal assistance and to contact umbrella organisations and youth federations at the latest at that point. Furthermore, if there is a perception that the neutrality requirement is a targeted and politically motivated measure, it is possible to seek free legal support from the “Gegenrechtsschutz” project (www.gegenrechtsschutz.de).

The discussion on dealing with neutrality requirements set out in funding conditions and grant decisions forms part of the article “The Myth of the Neutrality Requirement. An overview for greater certainty in practice’, which appears in *Corax* – a specialist magazine for child and youth work in Saxony, issue 2/2026, pp. 27–29. The issue can be ordered via the following link: https://corax-magazin.de/shop. The article is a revised, updated and comprehensively expanded version – particularly with regard to ancillary provisions – of the article: Bock, Sebastian/Lorenz, Maximilian/Reisner, Lars/Weis, Christian (2025): The Myth of the Neutrality Requirement: A Guide to Greater Certainty in Practice. In: punktum Special Edition, 2/25, pp. 9–13.